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As modern technology has given the medical profession the ability
to sustain life for increasing periods of time at decreasing levels of func-
tioning, there has been increasing recognition of a "right to die".' Ap-
pellate decisions2 and living will statutes 3 have clearly established the
right of a competent terminal patient to refuse life-sustaining treatment.
Several states have adopted statutes which expressly permit an individ-
ual to appoint a proxy to make treatment decisions 4.
Some patients requiring life-sustaining treatment become incompe-
tent without having executed a living will or appointing a proxy deci-
sionmaker. When this occurs, a surrogate decisionmaker must decide
whether to initiate, continue, withhold, or withdraw life-sustaining treat-
ment.
The development of legal rules governing the termination of life-
sustaining treatment for incompetent patients involves the following
questions: (1) the identity of the surrogate decisionmaker, (2) the stand-
ards governing that decision and (3) the appropriate procedural con-
straints on the exercise of the decisionmaking power. Courts that have
addressed this issue have often failed to separate these three questions.
Some decisions have ignored the distinction between making such deci-
sions for oneself, as competent patients do, and having the decision made
for one by another, as occurs with incompetent patients. 5 Further, re-
gardless of the standard applied, some courts may have been influenced
by factors not explicitly articulated in the decision and which are ethically
or politically inappropriate.
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'See generally President's Comm'n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Med-
icine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustain-
ing Treatment: A Report on Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues in Treatment
Decisions (U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Mar. 1983) [hereinafter Deciding to Forego];
Hirsch, Treatment Decisions for Terminal Patients, 33 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 140
(1986); Merritt, Equality for the Elderly Incompetent: A Proposal for Dignified
Death, 39 STAN. L. REV. 689 (1987); Vitiello, Louisiana's Natural Death Act and
Dilemmas in Medical Ethics, 46 LA. L. REV. 259 (1985); Note, Can A "Life Ad-
vocate" Impair the Constitutional Right to Reject Life-Prolonging Medical Treat-
ment? In re Jobes, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 553 (1987); Note, In re Conroy: Self-
Determination: Extending the Right to Die, 2 J. OF CONTEMP. HEALTH LAW & POL'Y
351 (1986); Note, Removal of a Nutrient Feeding Tube and the Need for a Living
Will, 3 J. OF CONTEMP. HEALTH LAW & POL'Y 253 (1987); Note, John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bludworth: Removing Courts from the Decision to Ter-
minate Life Support Systems, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 122 (1984); Note, In re
Storar: Euthanasia for Incompetent Patients, A Proposed Model, 3 PACE L. REV.
351 (1983); Note, The Right to Die in New Jersey: Another Plea for Legislation,
18 RUTGERS L. J. 235 (1986).
2 See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); Bouvia
v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Bartling v.
Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984), appeal after
remand, 184 Cal. App. 3d 97, 228 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1986); Foody v. Manchester
Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (1984); John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, ,62
So. 2d 160 (Fla. App. 1978), affd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re Gardner, 534
A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417,
497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,
373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d
115 (1980); In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d
363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Leach
v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (C.P. 1980); In
re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983) (Washington later modified the
law set forth in Colyer in In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984)).
3 Forty states and the District of Columbia have enacted living will legislation
in an effort to assure that the wishes of competent patients to discontinue treat-
ment are honored. Alabama Natural Death Act, ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to 8A-10
(1984); Alaska Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010 to
.100 (Supp. 1986); Arizona Medical Treat-ment Decision Act, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 36-3201 to 3210 (1986); Arkansas Rights of the Terminally Ill or Permanently
Unconscious Act, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to 218 (1987); California Natural
Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1988); Col-
orado Medical Treatment Decision Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113
(1987); Connecticut Removal of Life Support Systems Act, CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 19a-570 to 19a-575 (Supp. 1988); Delaware Death with Dignity Act, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2508 (1983); District of Columbia Natural Death Act of 1981,
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (Supp. 1988); Florida Life-Prolonging Pro-
cedure Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 765.01 to 765.15 (1989); Georgia Living Wills Act, GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1989); Hawaii Medical Treatment
Decisions Act, HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (Supp. 1988); Idaho Natural
Death Act, IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (1985 & Supp. 1989); Illinois Living
Will Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, paras. 701 to 710 (1987 & Supp. 1988);
Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-
8-11-1 to 16-8-11-22 (Supp. 1988); Iowa Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 to 144A.11 (West 1988); Kansas Natural Death Act, KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to 28,109 (1985); Louisiana Declarations Concerning Life-
Sustaining Procedures Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to 40:1299.58.10
(Supp. 1988); Maine Living Wills Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921 to
2934 (Supp. 1988); Maryland Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1988); Adult Health Care Decisions Act, ch.
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The question of the procedural limitations upon the decisionmaking
power of the surrogate must be treated separately6 from the substantive
standards that govern the decision. This Article examines the substantive
standards that have been enunciated by the courts and legislatures and
proposes a revised standard.
3, 1989 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 3 (West) (effective Aug. 1, 1989); Mississippi With-
drawal of Life-saving Mechanisms Act, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121
(Supp. 1988); Missouri Life Support Declarations Act, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 459.010
to .055 (Supp. 1988); Montana Living Will Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to
-206 (1987); Nevada Withholding or Withdrawal of Life Sustaining Procedures
Act, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540 to .690 (1986 & Supp. 1988); New Hampshire
Terminal Care Document Act, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1-16 (Supp. 1988);
New Mexico Right to Die Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -10 (1981 & Supp.
1985); North Carolina Right to Natural Death Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to
-323 (1988); Act of Apr. 12, 1989, 1989 N.D. Laws (H.B. 1481) (effective July 1,
1989); Oklahoma Natural Death Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101 to 3111
(Supp. 1988); Oregon Rights with Respect to Terminal Illness Act, OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 97.050 to -.090 (1984 & Supp. 1988); South Carolina Death with Dignity Act,
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Supp. 1987); Tennessee Right To Natural
Death Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1988); Texas Natural
Death Act, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590(h) (Supp. 1988); Utah Personal
Choice and Living Will Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (1985); Ver-
mont Terminal Care Document Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251 to 5262 (1988);
Virginia Natural Death Act, VA. CODE §§ 54.1-2981 to 54.1-2992 (1988); Wash-
ington Natural Death Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to -.122.905
(Supp. 1988); West Virginia Natural Death Act, W VA. CODE §§ 16-301 to -10
(1985); Wisconsin Natural Death Act, Wisc. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to -.15 (Supp.
1988); Wyoming Living Will Act, Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -109 (1987).
For a review and analysis of living will legislation, see SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT
TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS (1987).4 Arkansas Rights of the Terminally Ill or Permanently Unconscious Act, ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 20-17-202 (1987); California Durable Power of Attorney for Health
Care Act, CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 2430 to 2444, 2500 (Supp. 1988); Delaware Death
with Dignity Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502 (1983); Florida Life-Prolonging
Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 765.01 to 765.15 (1987); Idaho Natural Death Act,
IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4502 to 39-4506 (Supp. 1988); Illinois Power of Attorney for
Health Care Law, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, §§ 804-1 to 804-12 (1987 & Supp.
1988); Nevada Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 449.800 to 449.860 (Supp. 1988); Pennsylvania Uniform Durable Power
of Attorney Act, 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5601 to 5607 (Supp. 1988); Texas Natural
Death Act, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590(h)(3)(e) (Supp. 1988); Utah Personal
Choice and Living Will Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1106 (1985); Vermont Du-
rable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 §§ 3452 to
3463 (1987); Virginia Natural Death Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2984 (1988).
The appointment of a proxy in the patient's advance directive has been ap-
proved in appellate decisions. See Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); In re
Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
1 See In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d
810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
6 Until Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. banc 1988), cert. granted, 109
S. Ct. 3240 (1989) (argued Dec. 6, 1989, summarized in 58 U.S.L.W. 3395), the
consensus among appellate courts which had decided the question was that the
guardian of a patient who is permanently unconscious, either comatose or in a
persistent vegetative state without any reasonable hope for a return to a cognitive,
sapient state, may direct the removal of a respirator without seeking court ap-
1989-90]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
I. THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT
There is consensus among courts and legislatures that a competent
patient who is terminally ill may decide to forego life-sustaining treat-
ment, even though the choice will hasten the patient's death.7 This right
is derived from the common law right of all persons to bodily integrity
and self-determination.8 Many of the cases have grounded the right to
refuse treatment in the constitutional right of privacy, which guarantees
freedom from government interference in certain personal decisions. 9 Re-
spect for the autonomy of the individual underlies the common law and
constitutional doctrines and the living will legislation.
proval. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 665 (concurrence of
institutional ethics committee required as to prognosis); Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at
220, 741 P.2d at 688; In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d at 818-19, 689 P.2d at 1377-
78; In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 127-30, 660 P.2d at 746-47. There appeared to
be general agreement among courts that had addressed the termination of life-
suppport that it should be permitted without court approval when the patient is
in a persistent vegetative state and is surrounded by close family who are unan-
imously of the opinion that the patient would so choose. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d
at 926; In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115; In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394,
529 A.2d 434; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647; Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. 1,
426 N.E.2d 809; In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738. The Rasmussen
court specifically reserved the question of the right of close family members to
terminate life support without the appointment of a guardian. 154 Ariz. at 220,
741 P.2d at 687. However, the Cruzan court rejected this principle. 760 S.W.2d
at 426-27.
Some of the recent statutes permit decisionmaking by certain family members
with few or no procedural constraints. North Carolina Natural Death Act, N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -322 (1988) (confirmation by two physicians of diagnosis,
no other procedural protection); Oregon Rights with Respect to Terminal Illness
Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050 to -.090 (1987) (physician may decide alone if no
family member available).
Others fail to address the issue of the factors that may or must be considered
by the surrogate decisionmaker. Louisiana Life-sustaining Procedures Act, LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1 to -.58.10 (West Supp. 1989); North Carolina
Natural Death Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (1988); Oregon Rights
with Respect to Terminal Illness Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050 to -.090 (1987);
Natural Death Act of Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2992 (1988).7 Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674; In re Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185,
245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1988); Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297;
Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220; Foody, 40 Conn. Supp. 127,
482 A.2d 713; Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980);
Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla.); Satz, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. App.); In re Gardn-3r,
534 A.2d 947 (Me.); Brophy, 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626; In re Spring, 380
Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417; In re Hier,
18 Mass. App. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959 (1984); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn.);
In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404; In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d
1209; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647; In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420
N.E.2d 64; Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 516
N.Y.S.2d 677 (1987); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987); In re
Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372; In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660
P.2d 738.
8 See cases cited in note 7.9 Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 215, 741 P.2d at 682; In re Spring, 380 Mass. at 634,
405 N.E.2d at 119; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424; In re Torres,
[Vol. 3:2
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The courts have balanced the patient's right to privacy in personal
decisionmaking against four potentially countervailing state interests:
the preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, the maintenance of the
integrity of the medical profession, and the interests of third parties. 10
The state's interest in preserving the life of the patient is usually said
to diminish with the prognosis of the patient and the intrusiveness of the
treatment.1" In fact, appellate decisions have rarely held that the state's
interest in preserving the life of a terminal patient outweighed the pa-
tient's interest in avoiding the treatment unless the treatment offered
some hope of cure, or at a minimum, restoration of a prior level of func-
tioning.' 2
The state's interest in the prevention of suicide is actually one aspect
of the interest in preserving life generally. However, courts that have
treated this issue separately regard the decision of a patient to refuse
life-sustaining treatment as a death by natural causes and not a suicide,
because the patient's underlying condition actually causes the death.'
3
357 N.W.2d at 340 (Minn.) (right also based on statutory authority); In re Quinlan,
70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663; Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. at 9, 426 N.E.2d at 814; In
re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 121-22, 660 P.2d at 742; cf. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at
348, 486 A.2d at 1222-23 (refused to decide whether constitutional right of privacy
applied to guardian's decision whether to terminate artifical feeding of a conscious,
elderly, incompetent, nursing home resident. Right considered sufficiently well
grounded in common law right to self-determination).
The right to refuse treatment has also been grounded in state constitutional
privacy rights. See Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220; In re Barry,
445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. App. 1984); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738.
1o Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 216, 741 P.2d at 683; Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at
195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225; Foody, 40 Conn. Supp. at __, 482 A.2d at 718; Brophy,
398 Mass. at 432, 497 N.E.2d at 634; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at
425; In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d at 339 (Minn.); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 348-49, 486
A.2d at 1223; Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. at 9,426 N.E.2d at 814; In re Colyer, 99 Wash.
2d at 122, 660 P.2d at 743; In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 556, 747 P.2d at 451.
11 Brophy, 398 Mass. at 433, 497 N.E.2d at 635; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 742,
370 N.E.2d at 425; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664; In re Colyer,
99 Wash. 2d at 122-23, 660 P.2d at 743.
12 In re Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
978 (1964) (blood transfusions would save patient's life and preserve status quo);
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971)
(blood transfusions would save adult patient's life); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at
375-76, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275-76. But see Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d
408 (Mo.) (state's strong interest in preserving life of patient outweighed any
right to refuse treatment when treatment was not burdensome to patient because
she was in a persistent vegetative state); In re Westchester County Medical Cen-
ter, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988) (common law right
of self-determination in treatment decisions was personal to the patient and could
not be exercised by family absent clear and convincing evidence that patient had
made a settled and firm commitment to terminate treatment under similar cir-
cumstances).
13 See, e.g., Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 196, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225; Satz, 362
So. 2d at 162 (Fla. App.); Brophy, 398 Mass. at 439, 497 N.E.2d at 638; In re
Farrell, 108 N.J. at 350, 529 A.2d at 411; In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 138, 660
P.2d at 743.
1989-901
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Therefore, the state interest is not contravened by the decision to refuse
life support. 14
The courts have reasoned that the interest in maintaining the integ-
rity of the medical profession has not been implicated in decisions to
withhold or withdraw life support because the ethics of the medical profes-
sion do not require treatment in these cases.15 One later case based its
decision upon the prevailing medical ethic that the continuation of life-
sustaining treatment is contrary to the ethics of the profession when there
is no hope for the patient's recovery.16
Finally, the interests of third parties have rarely been held to be
sufficient to outweigh the choice of a competent, terminal patient who
chooses to forego artificial life support, as distinguished from life-saving
treatment such as blood transfusions. 7 In the one case involving both
artificial life support and the interests of the patient's minor children,
the interests of the patient's children were adequately protected by the
ability of the surviving parent to raise them, and the patient herself had
considered the strain that her illness caused her children in deciding to
discontinue the use of the respirator. 8
There is disagreement among courts and legislatures about the per-
missibility of terminating artificial feeding. Some authorities view arti-
ficial feeding methods through nasogastric, gastrostomy, or jejunostomy
tubes and intravenous injections, as strictly medical procedures. 19 Others
forbid the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration but allow the
14 Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 196, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 225; Satz, 362 So. 2d at
162 (Fla. App.); Brophy, 398 Mass. at 439, 497 N.E.2d at 638; In re Conroy, 98
N.J. at 350-51, 486 A.2d at 1224; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 43, 355 A.2d at 665;
In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 123, 660 P.2d at 743.
15 Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 217-18, 741 P.2d at 684-85; Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
at 744, 370 N.E.2d at 426; Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. at 10, 426 N.E.2d at 814; In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. at 351-52, 486 A.2d at 1224-25; In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 123,
660 P.2d at 743-44; see also In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 45-48, 355 A.2d at 666-67
(court discussed at length the change, inconsistency, and disagreement within
the medical profession as to the ethical requirements regarding the treatment of
permanently unconscious patients).
16 Brophy, 398 Mass. at 439-40, 497 N.E.2d at 638.
17 Most cases in which patients have been denied the right to refuse life-saving
treatment involved the refusal of blood transfusions for religious reasons. For
example, the Georgetown court ordered the transfusions when it was shown that
the patient had young dependent children and that he could accept the trans-
fusions if ordered by the court, for then he would not have chosen to disobey the
religious commandment. 331 F.2d at 1008; see also Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d
670. However, the interest of the state in maintaining prison security was held
to outweigh the interest of a prisoner-patient in exercising his right to refuse
dialysis in Commissioner of Corrections v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 261, 399 N.E.2d
452, 456 (1979).
18 In re Farrell, 108 N.J. at 343, 529 A.2d at 412-13.
"I Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1016-17, 195 Cal. Rptr.
484, 490 (1983); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. App. 1986);
In re Gardner, 534 A.2d at 954-55 (Me.); Brophy, 398 Mass. at 437-38, 497 N.E.2d
at 637; In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 372-74, 486 A.2d at 1236-37; Delio, 129 A.D.2d
1, 18, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 689; cf. In re Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 840.
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discontinuation of other forms of life support. 20 A number of state statutes
specifically prohibit the termination of artificial feeding or hydration. 21
Logically, there may be little difference between discontinuing a ma-
chine that maintains the patient's breathing and discontinuing artificial
nutrition and hydration.22 However, discontinuing artificial nutrition re-
sults in death by starvation and thirst over a period of days or weeks, as
contrasted with the almost immediate death produced by discontinuing
a respirator.
The increased length of time that it would take for the patient to die
from starvation and dehydration caused by the withdrawal of artificial
feeding has influenced the opinion of some judges.23 The emotional ram-
ifications of denying food and water to a seriously ill person have also
affected judicial opinions and legislation.2 4 Clearly, this is a question
about which there is no consensus among courts and legislatures.
II. THE SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT STANDARD
Most courts that have considered the question whether another person
can refuse life-sustaining treatment on behalf of an incompetent patient
have viewed the issue as involving the exercise by a surrogate of the
20 Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d 408,423 (Mo.); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201(f) (1986);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-103(7) (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a 570(1) (Supp.
1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-2(5)(A) (1985 & Supp.- 1988); HAw. REV. STAT.
§ 327D-2 (Supp. 1988); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 702(d) (1987); IND. CODE
§ 16-8-11-4 (Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE § 144A.2(5) (1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 2921(4) (Supp. 1988); Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.010(3) (Supp. 1988); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 137-H:2(II) (Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3102(4), 3080.1
to 3080.5 (West Supp. 1988) (Hydration and Nutrition for Incompetent Patients
Act); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-20(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 32-11-103(4), (5) (Supp. 1988); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(5)(a)(b) (Supp. 1988).
21 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201(f) (1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-
103(7) (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a 570(1) (Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-
32-2(5) (A) (1985 & Supp. 1988); HAw. REV. STAT. § 327D-2 (Supp. 1988); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 702(d) (1987); IND. CODE § 16-8-11-4 (Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE
§ 144A.2(5) (1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2921(4) (Supp. 1988); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 459.010(3) (Supp. 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §137-H:2(II) (Supp. 1988);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3102(4), 3080.1 to 3080.5 (West Supp. 1988); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-77-20(b)(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 32-11-103(4),
(5) (Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(5)(a)(b) (Supp. 1988).
22 Cf. Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. at 12-13, 426 N.E.2d at 816 (allowing withdrawal
of respirator, but not of nasogastric feeding tube).
Brophy, 398 Mass. at 444, 497 N.E.2d at 641 (Lynch, J., dissenting) (includes
graphic description of the process of death by starvation and dehydration); In re
Peter, 108 N.J. at 390, 529 A.2d at 432 (O'Hern, J., dissenting); Delio, 129 A.D.2d
1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677.
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 372-73, 486 A.2d at 1236 (considered and rejected
the emotional symbolism of food in deciding that artificial feeding and hydration
should not be distinguished from other forms of life-sustaining treatment); In re
Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 570-71, 747 P.2d at 458 (Anderson, J., dissenting); see
also In re Peter, 108 N.J. at 390, 529 A.2d at 432.
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incompetent patient's right to refuse treatment. 25 Having so framed the
issue, the courts initially permitted surrogate refusals of treatment under
the substituted judgment doctrine. This doctrine requires the surrogate
decisionmaker to make the decision that the patient would have made if
competent to decide.26 The surrogate decisionmaker must consider the
factors that the patient would consider, including the patient's present
and future incompetence.
27
The courts have reasoned that application of the substituted judgment
doctrine is required in order to demonstrate the respect of the law for the
dignity and autonomy of the incompetent patient. 28 Yet, this reasoning
ignores the differences between the situations of competent patients and
those of incompetent patients.29 Although a competent patient who re-
fuses treatment may be exercising his or her autonomy and self-deter-
mination, the danger exists that the surrogate making a decision for an
incompetent patient may be implementing his or her own values rather
than those of the patient. The surrogate may be motivated by dismay at
the disability of the patient or fear of financial ruin, rather than a com-
mitment to care for the patient as he or she would do if competent. Even
a surrogate acting in the utmost good faith can, at best, make an educated
guess as to the choice that the patient would have made.
The substituted judgment doctrine was initially applied to incom-
petent patients whether or not they had any prior history of competence.30
Where the patient has never been competent to make treatment decisions,
however, it is impossible to determine what decision the patient would
have made if competent. For example, in In re Saikewicz, 31 the court
25 Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 219, 741 P.2d at 686; Foody, 40 Conn. Supp. at 127,
482 A.2d at 720; Brophy, 398 Mass. at 430-31, 497 N.E.2d at 633-34; In re Spring,
380 Mass. at 634, 405 N.E.2d at 119; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 745, 370 N.E.2d at
430; In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 356, 486 A.2d at 1227; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41-
42, 355 A.2d at 664; In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 567, 747 P.2d at 457.
26 Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 926 (Fla.); Brophy, 398 Mass. at 433, 497 N.E.2d
at 634-35; In re Spring, 380 Mass. at 634,405 N.E.2d at 119; Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
at 750-51, 370 N.E.2d at 431; In re Jobes, 108 N.J. at 404, 529 A.2d at 444; In
re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 567, 747 P.2d at 456; cf. In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at
131-32, 660 P.2d at 747-48. See also Deciding to Forego, supra note 1, at 132.
In re Spring, 380 Mass. at 634, 405 N.E.2d at 119; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at
752-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431; In re Jobes, 108 N.J. at 404, 529 A.2d at 444; In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664; In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 131-32, 660
P.2d at 747-48.
2 Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 746-47, 370 N.E.2d at 428-29; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J.
at 41, 355 A.2d at 664; In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 128, 660 P.2d at 746.
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 392-93, 486 A.2d at 1246-47 (Handler, J., concurring
and dissenting); see also In re Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 208, 245 Cal. Rptr.
at 854 (application of substituted judgment to implement a permanently uncon-
scious patient's right to choose was described as a legal fiction). See generally
Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden
Values in the Law, 28 ARiz. L. REv. 373 (1986).
3 See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417.
31 Id. Other authorities have rejected the application of the substituted judg-
ment doctrine to the never-competent patient in favor of a standard requiring
the surrogate to be governed by the best interests of the patient. In re Storar
involved a profoundly retarded patient afflicted with bladder cancer. His mother
sought to discontinue blood transfusions which caused him discomfort but im-
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applied the substituted judgment test to decide whether to allow chem-
otherapy for a 67 year old leukemia patient who had been mentally
retarded all his life. The court's attempt to consider the effect of the
treatment as perceived by the patient was appropriate. Yet, the attri-
bution of the court's values to the patient weakened the theoretical basis
of the doctrine.
The substituted judgment doctrine has also been applied in cases
where there was little or rio evidence of the previously competent patient's
wishes regarding life-sustaining treatment. 2 The reasoning in these cases
is insufficiently protective of the interests of the patient. Arguably, the
courts in these cases have allowed inappropriate considerations to influ-
ence their decisions.
In In re Spring,33 the Massachusetts Supreme Court approved a de-
cision to terminate dialysis of a conscious patient suffering from chronic
organic brain syndrome. The court based its decision in part upon evidence
of a close family relationship between the patient, his wife and adult son
in its determination that their decision should be implemented.3 4 Al-
though there was evidence that the patient had previously been a robust,
active man, there was no evidence of the patient's beliefs or preferences.
The opinion explicitly relied upon the lack of evidence that financial
considerations had played a role in the wife's determination of her hus-
band's preferences. 35 However, the court's concern over testimony that
the financial situation had deteriorated since the initial hearing was
relegated to a footnote and did not change the ultimate decision.36
The trial judge had before him expert testimony that supported the
decision to terminate treatment because under a subjective quality-of-
proved his functioning. The New York Court of Appeals found it illogical to
attempt to implement the self-determination of a patient who had never had the
capacity to make medical decisions. 52 N.Y.2d at 370-73, 420 N.E.2d at 72-73,
438 N.Y.S.2d at 274-77. The New Jersey Supreme Court also rejected this ap-
proach in dicta in In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 363, 486 A.2d at 1231. The President's
Commission also rejected the use of the substituted judgment standard with
respect to the never-competent patient. Deciding to Forego, supra note 1, at 133.
See also D. WALTON, ETHIcs OF WITHDRAWAL OF LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS 45-48
(1983) [hereinafter ETHICS OF WITHDRAWAL]; Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy De-
cisionmaking for Incompetents, 29 UCLA L. REv. 386, 392 (1981).
32 See, e.g., In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (patient on kidney
dialysis who had acquiesced in treatment while competent removed from dialysis
based upon testimony of wife and son. In relying on this testimony, the court
determined that the patient, if competent, would have chosen this option); In re
Hier, 18 Mass. App. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959 (conscious patient with long history of
severe mental illness repeatedly pulled out gastric tubes); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d
at 340 (Minn.) (comatose patient's respirator discontinued based in part upon the
testimony of cousin and friend that he had refused to wear a pacemaker and that
they did not believe he would want to be sustained in that condition); In re Colyer,
99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (respirator-dependent comatose patient did not
like doctors). See text accompanying notes 33 through 44, infra.
380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115.
Id. at 640, 405 N.E.2d at 122.
5 Id.
Id. at 640, 405 N.E.2d at 122, n.3.
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life standard the patient was no longer a person worthy of care.37 To base
the treatment decision on such a consideration is, in essence, to denigrate
the value of the lives of handicapped patients. That the Supreme Court
made no mention of this testimony in its opinion gives one pause.
For the court to consider this opinion sub silentio is far worse than
to consider it openly. Explicit discussion of the values which influence a
court's decision at least opens the question of the appropriateness of those
values to public debate. The omission of a definite rejection of this factor
from the court's opinion diminishes the reliability of the stated reasoning.
The ruling in In re Colyer38 also appears to have been based on in-
sufficient evidence of the patient's intentions. The patient's family pre-
sented no evidence of the patient's actual beliefs or values other than her
independence and dislike of doctors and hospitals. The husband's affidavit
in support of the withdrawal of the respirator stated, "[i]t is very painful
for me and Bertha's family to see her in her current condition."39 The
emotional distress that a loved one may feel upon viewing the patient is
hardly justifies a decision to discontinue treatment. Yet, relying on the
unanimity of the family, the Colyer court approved the withdrawal of the
respirator a mere twenty-five days after the patient first became coma-
tose.
40
It appears that the courts applying the substituted judgment doctrine
in these cases are in fact projecting their own values and beliefs upon
the patient. This phenomenon appeared in its most extreme form in In
re Hier.41 This case involved a conscious ninety-two year old woman who
had been a mental patient for fifty-seven years. The issue was whether
the court could consent to surgery for the implantation of a gastrostomy
tube to facilitate artificial feeding. The patient had repeatedly physically
resisted attempts to insert or reinsert the tube. Emphasizing the intru-
siveness of the treatment, the court considered the patient's resistance
as "a plea for privacy and personal dignity ... by a person... for whom
life has little left to offer. ' 42 Yet, her mental condition rendered it unlikely
37 One of the physicians testified that in deciding that the dialysis should be
discontinued, he considered "whether the patient is a real person, whether the
person is happy to be alive, whether other people around him or her are happy to
have him alive." G. Annas & L. Glantz, Withholding and Withdrawing of Life-
Sustaining Treatment for Elderly Incompetent Patients: A Review of Court De-
cisions and Legislative Approaches in Philosophical, Legal, and Social Aspects of
Surrogate Decisionmaking for Elderly Individuals, prepared for the Office of Tech-
nology Assessment 1, 21 (May 1987) [hereinafter Surrogate Decisionmaking]
(quoting trial transcript) (emphasis added). This document is available from Nat'l
Technical Information Serv., U.S. Dep't Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Spring-
field, Va. 22161.
99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738.
39 Id. at 117, 660 P.2d at 740.
40 Id. at 117, 123, 660 P.2d at 740, 743.
41 18 Mass. App. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959. See also Justice Handler's opinions in
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 398-99, 486 A.2d at 1245-46 (Handler, J., concurring and
dissenting) and in In re Jobes, 108 N.J. at 449-50, 529 A.2d at 459 (Handler, J.,
concurring).
42 18 Mass. App. at 206, 464 N.E.2d at 965.
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that she understood that without the artificial feeding, she would expe-
rience a painful death by starvation.
The Minnesota Supreme Court engaged in similar projection in In re
Torres.43 Here, there was little evidence of the patient's values and pref-
erences other than his refusal to wear a pacemaker. The only relative
who testified was neither the guardian nor the petitioner to terminate
treatment. The hospital whose negligence caused the patient's coma
sought to withdraw the respirator. Although the trial court was satisfied
that the patient would have chosen to discontinue the respirator, the
court does not appear to have been convinced. A substituted judgment
analysis is subsumed in the discussion of the patient's best interests. The
court noted that the patient "may well have wished to avoid '[t]he ultimate
horror... the possibility of being maintained in limbo, in a sterile room,
by machines controlled by strangers.' "44
The substituted judgment test fulfills its purpose to promote patient
autonomy only when the surrogate decisionmaker knows the patient in-
timately. Only then can the surrogate have sufficient information con-
cerning the patient's behavior, values, preferences, and personality to
predict with confidence the choice that the patient would have made.
When no one is so close to the patient, or when the patient has never had
the capacity to make treatment decisions, the substituted judgment stand-
ard is inappropriate.
III. THE BEST INTERESTS TEST
Some courts have recognized the fallacy inherent in the application
of the substituted judgment test to patients whose preferences cannot be
known.45 In such situations, these courts have applied the best interests
test.46 Under this test, the surrogate may choose to terminate life-sus-
taining treatment if the discontinuation of treatment is in the patient's
best interests.47 The best interests test is said to be objective, based on
the choice of most reasonable people in similar circumstances. 4 The test
includes consideration of the patient's prognosis for recovery of function-
ing, the advantages and disadvantages to the patient of treatment, and
4 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn.).
"Id. at 340.
-See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 364, 486 A.2d at 1231; In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d
at 378-80, 420 N.E.2d at 72-73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274-75. See also In re Drabick,
200 Cal. App. 3d at 208, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 at 854.
" See, e.g., Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 222, 741 P.2d at 689; In re Storar, 52
N.Y.2d at 380-81, 420 N.E.2d at 72-73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274-75; In re Torres, 357
N.W.2d at 339 (Minn.); In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d at 815, 820, 689 P.2d at 1375-
76, 1378. The best interests standard is typically applied in probate proceedings
to determine the propriety of a guardian's decision for the ward. In fact, Ras-
mussen, In re Torres, and In re Hamlin all involved guardianship proceedings.
47 See Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 222, 741 P.2d at 689; In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d
at 337 (Minn.) (conservator may direct the discontinuation of life support if treat-
ment no longer serves the patient's best interests); In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d
at 815, 820, 689 P.2d at 1375-76, 1378. See also Deciding To Forego, supra note
1, at 135.Deciding To Forego, supra note 1, at 134-35; In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d at
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the quality and extent of life sustained.49 The test has occasionally been
formulated as permitting termination of the continuation if treatment is
no longer in the patient's best interests.5 0
The difference between these two formulations may seem merely se-
mantic. However, it is the opinion of this author that to determine that
it is in the best interests of a patient to terminate treatment is not the
same as determining that the continuation of treatment no longer serves
his or her interests.
Some writers conceive of the permanently comatose patient as lacking
humanity because of the absence of cognition. They therefore regard these
patients as having no interests in continuing treatment.51 Others conceive
of the permanently unconscious patient as having an interest in pre-
serving life in order to preserve the possibility of returning to a cognitive,
sapient state. However, the possibility of a return to cognition is minimal,
and the severity of the probable physical and mental disabilities is ex-
treme. Therefore, these authorities have not considered the continued
provision of life support to the permanently unconscious patient to be in
his or her best interests.52
IV. THE CONROY FORMULATION
The New Jersey Supreme Court attempted to refine both the substi-
tuted judgment standard and the best interests standard in In re Conroy.53
That decision announced three possible tests to be applied, depending
upon the availability of information about the values, beliefs, and pref-
erences of the incompetent patient. The subjective test is to be applied
where there is clear evidence of the patient's wishes. Under the subjective
test, the decisionmaker may choose to terminate life-sustaining treatment
if there is clear evidence that the patient would so choose.- The deci-
sionmaker may consider any written directive executed by the patient,
820, 689 P.2d at 1378. But see In re Storar in which the best interests standard
was described as protecting the health and welfare of the ward, and in which the
retarded ward was considered as a child. 52 N.Y.2d at 380-81, 420 N.E.2d at 73,
438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
49 Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 222, 741 P.2d at 689; Deciding to Forego, supra note
1, at 135; cf. In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d at 339, 340 (Minn.) (best interests did not
require continuation of treatment where permanently unconscious patient had
no chance of recovery and there was some evidence that he would not have wanted
to continue treatment).
Deciding to Forego, supra note 1, at 134; In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d at 339
(Minn.).
51 See generally A. Buchanan & D. Brock, Surrogate Decisionmaking for Elderly
Individuals Who Are Incompetent or of Questionable Competence in Surrogate
Decisionmaking, supra note 37, at 84-86. For a discussion of this issue see Buch-
anan, The Limits of Proxy Decisionmaking for Incompetents, 29 UCLA L. REv.
386, 402-04 (1981).
52 In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d at 338-39 (Minn.), quoting Deciding to Forego,
supra note 1, at 181-83; cf. Brophy, 398 Mass. at 434-35, 497 N.E.2d at 636.
98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209.
Id. at 360-61. 486 A.2d at 1229.
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the patient's past behavior with respect to medical treatment, moral and
religious beliefs, and any statements made in conversation regarding how
he or she would wish to be treated in the event of terminal illness.55 This
test is essentially similar to the substituted judgment test, except that
the court has stipulated that it is not to be applied where the evidence
of the patient's desires is less than clear.56
Conroy requires the application of a limited objective test where there
is some evidence of the patient's wishes, but not enough to justify the
application of the subjective test.5 7 Under this test, the surrogate may
decide to terminate life-sustaining treatment where the benefits of the
treatment are markedly outweighed by the burdens of life with treat-
ment.58 The decisionmaker may consider the patient's prognosis, level of
functioning, level of pain, and the patient's potential for experiencing
physical pleasure, emotional enjoyment, and intellectual satisfaction. 59
However, the decisionmaker may not consider the value of the patient's
life to others.60
Where there is no evidence of the patient's wishes as to treatment,
the surrogate's action is governed by the pure objective test.6 1 This stand-
ard permits the termination of life-sustaining treatment only if the ben-
efits of treatment are clearly and markedly outweighed by the burdens
to the patient of life with treatment.6 2 In examining the benefits and
burdens to the patient, the decisionmaker may consider the patient's
prognosis, level of functioning, and level of pain. Consistent with the
limited objective test, the pure objective test requires that continued
treatment produce such unavoidable, severe pain as to render its contin-
uation inhumane before treatment may be foregone.6 3
The pure objective test is similar to the best interests test in that it
focuses on the benefits and detriments of treatment and the prognosis of
restoration to the former level of functioning. Further, it disallows con-
sideration of the interests of others or the social value of the patient's
life. However, it differs from the traditional best interests test in its
emphasis on unavoidable physical pain.
55 Id. at 361-62,486 A.2d at 1229-30. In Conroy, the New Jersey Supreme Court
overruled its prior decision in Quinlan which had prohibited evidence of state-
ments made by Ms. Quinlan in conversation, regarding her desire to forego life-
sustaining treatment. Id. at 362-63, 486 A.2d at 1230, overruling Quinlan, 70
N.J. at 21, 41, 355 A.2d at 664, 672. The weight given statements is based upon(1) the remoteness, consistency, and thoughtfulness of the statements, (2) the
maturity of the declarant when the statements were made, and (3) the degree of
detail as to the circumstances the patient would prefer not to endure. Conroy, 98
N.J. at 363, 486 A.2d at 1230-31.
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 360-61, 486 A.2d at 1229.
Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232.
RId.
59 Id.
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 367, 486 A.2d at 1232-33.
61 Id. at 366-67, 486 A.2d at 1232.
62 Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232.
- Id.
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The Conroy limited objective and pure objective tests have been crit-
icized for their emphasis on pain as a criterion for deciding to withhold
or withdraw life support.r There is evidence that most pain can be re-
lieved with medication, so that severe, unremitting physical pain is un-
usual. 65 Of more importance to many terminal patients is the loss of
independence and self-control. The emphasis on pain may distort the
decisionmaker's analysis because it fails to encompass other factors which
should affect the decision when these factors are of more importance to
the person affected."
In 1987, the New Jersey Supreme Court refined the Conroy analysis
in a trilogy of cases. In re Farrel16 7 reiterated the right of a competent
patient to refuse life-sustaining treatment in a case involving a competent
patient. In re Peter" recognized the right of a proxy decisionmaker, ap-
pointed in writing by the patient while competent, to refuse life-sustain-
ing treatment on behalf of a currently incompetent patient in a persistent
vegetative state. The Peter court held that the subjective test announced
in Conroy applies in all cases where a surrogate seeks to make treatment
decisions for an incompetent patient, regardless of the patient's prognosis
or life expectancy.69 There must be clear and convincing evidence of the
patient's choice either to forego life-sustaining treatment or to designate
an attorney-in-fact or other proxy to make treatment decisions.7 0
The court distinguished between patients in a persistent vegetative
state and patients with some cognitive functioning, both in the procedure
to be followed and in the substantive standard to be applied by the de-
cisionmaker. The Conroy life-expectancy requirement does not apply to
patients in a persistent vegetative state because such patients derive no
benefit from continued treatment.71
In the third case in the trilogy, In re Jobes, the court held that the
limited objective and pure objective tests announced in Conroy do not
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 394-96, 486 A.2d at 1247-48 (Handler, J., concurring
and dissenting). See also G. Annas & L. Glantz, supra note 37, at 17 (The "limited
objective test" is merely an alternative description of the "substituted judgment
test." The pure objective test tends to ignore the plight of the individual patient,
by justifying actions that otherwise could not objectively be viewed as in his or
her 'best interests'."). Id.
Deciding to Forego, supra note 1, at 277-78, nn.1, 2.
66In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 394-96, 486 A.2d at 1247-48 (Handler, J., concurring
and dissenting); N. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND DYING 72-73 (1987).
108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987).
108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
Id. at 377-78, 529 A.2d at 425.
70 Id. at 377-78, 384, 529 A.2d at 425, 429. When the patient is an elderly
nursing home resident, notification of the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized
Elderly is required. The Ombudsman must obtain the concurrence of two inde-
pendent physicians in the prognosis before life-sustaining treatment may be ter-
minated. Id. at 383-84, 529 A.2d at 429. The Ombudsman should defer the actual
decision to any designated proxy or close family member. Id. at 384, 529 A.2d at
429. If the patient has no close family and has not appointed a proxy decision-
maker, a guardian must be appointed. Id.
71 Id. at 375, 529 A.2d at 424.
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apply to patients in a persistent vegetative state.72 Rather, if the patient
in a persistent vegetative state has one or more close and caring family
members, and there is some trustworthy evidence that the patient would
refuse life-sustaining treatment, the family may decide to forego that
treatment in an exercise of substituted judgment.73 Because the family
will generally have the greatest knowledge of the patient's personal val-
ues and the greatest concern for the patient's welfare, the court found
the family to be the best qualified entity to make treatment decisions.74
The court specifically reserved ruling on the substantive standard to be
applied in situations where there is no one who is sufficiently familiar
with the patient's personality to provide the kind of detailed information
necessary to apply the subjective standard.7 5
V. RECENT REJECTION OF THE TRADITIONAL TESTS
Two recent decisions have rejected both the substituted judgment
standard and the best interests standard in making decisions to forego
artificial feeding for incompetent patients.7 6 Both express concern with
the preservation of the patient's autonomy and the need for certainty as
to the patient's desires. Yet, the two courts have followed very different
lines of reasoning, perhaps because of their different political climates.
In re Westchester County Medical Center ex rel. O'Connor7 7 involved
an elderly stroke victim with severely limited cognitive abilities, who
required intravenous feeding after she had lost her gag reflex but was
not suffering from any other terminal condition. The hospital petitioned
for approval to insert a nasogastric tube on the ground that the patient
would die of thirst and starvation without it. Her family objected because
the patient had always opposed the use of artificial life support. The court
held that the provision of life support to an incompetent patient could be
withheld only if the patient's clearly expressed intention to forego such
treatment in similar circumstances had been established by clear and
convincing evidence.78 The court rejected the use of the substituted judg-
ment standard and of objective factors generally, reasoning that "no per-
son or court should substitute its judgment as to what would be an ac-
ceptable quality of life for another. '7 9
72 108 N.J. at 420-24, 529 A.2d at 447-50; see also In re Peter, 108 N.J. at 384-
85, 529 A.2d at 429.73In re Jobes, 108 N.J. at 415, 529 A.2d at 445.
Id. at 416, 529 A.2d at 445. As with other incompetent patients, if the patient
has no close family and has not left clear and convincing evidence of his or her
treatment decision or of a choice of a proxy decisionmaker, a guardian must be
appointed. Id. at 420, 529 A.2d at 447. Regardless of the standard used and the
identity of the surrogate decisionmaker, the surrogate must obtain the opinions
of two disinterested physicians knowledgeable in neurology who concur in the
diagnosis of the patient's persistent vegetative state and in the prognosis that
there is no reasonable possibility of a return to cognitive functioning. Id. at 422,
529 A.2d at 448.
75 Id. at 424, 529 A.2d at 449.
76 Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo.); In re Westchester Cty. Medical Center ex rel.
O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988).
11 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886.
7 Id. at 531, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
Id. at 530, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892. In the case before it, the
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The court noted that the requirement of clear and convincing proof,
through oral statements of the patient's commitment to forego life support
under the circumstances, presented several difficulties. First, there is the
possibility that the patient has changed his or her mind.80 Second, because
human beings cannot foretell the future, the medical treatment and the
circumstances that require a decision may be quite different from those
that the patient envisioned.8 ' Third, there is a danger that the patient
might have made the statements casually, without the deliberation in
which he or she would engage if actually making the decision.8 2 Never-
theless, the court's primary concern was the right of the individual patient
to make his or her own treatment decisions rather than having those
decisions made by others. Therefore, the court required clear and con-
vincing evidence demonstrating the firm and settled purpose of the pa-
tient to forego life support, rather than permitting the exercise of
substituted judgment.8 3
The rule requiring a finding of the patient's present intent has been
criticized as demanding the impossible in that the patient's desires at the
time of making the decision are, by definition, unknowable. 84 In addition,
there is no way to exclude the possibility that the patient has had a
change of mind. 5 Further, the rule does not distinguish between the
conscious patient and one in a persistent vegetative state, nor does it
distinguish between the patient suffering from a terminal condition, for
whom further treatment might be painful and futile, and one who is not. 6
If a humane rule of law would be likely to allow the withholding or
withdrawal of life support from the permanently unconscious or terminal
patient, this rule would not permit such a result.87
court ruled that the proof was insufficient to justify the conclusion that the patient
would have declined artificial feeding. Id. at 534, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d
at 894. Ms. O'Connor had repeatedly stated over a period of many years that she
would never want to be a burden to anyone, that she found the use of life support
machinery "monstrous" and that she would never want to lose her dignity. Never-
theless, the situations which prompted these statements were primarily the pain-
ful deaths of family members from terminal cancer. The patient's need for life
support was not caused by any terminal illness, but by the gradual debilitation
caused by a series of strokes, and to decline the treatment would be likely to
cause, rather than prevent, a painful death. Id. at 533-34, 531 N.E.2d at 614-15,
534 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
8 In re Westchester Cty. Medical Center ex rel. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 530,
531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
81 Id.
82 Id.
a Id.
" Id. at 536, 531 N.E.2d at 616, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 895-96 (Hancock, J., concur-
ring). The impossible demands also include the expectation that the patient
foretell the future by anticipating both his or her condition and the means that
will be available to sustain life, if the desire to forego life support is to be respected.
Id. at 549-50, 531 N.E.2d at 625, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 904 (Simons, J., dissenting).
'*In re Westchester Cty. Medical Center ex rel. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 536,
531 N.E.2d at 617, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 896 (Hancock, J., concurring).
Id. at 537, 531 N.E.2d at 617, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 896 (Hancock, J., concurring).87 /d.
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The requirement that the patient's statements have anticipated the
nature of the condition, the type of support available, and the circum-
stances which necessitate a decision as to life support renders the rule
extremely difficult to satisfy. The rule has been criticized as making
unrealistic demands upon the lay person to understand and express his
or her desires concerning future treatment in precise medical terms.88
Perhaps the close and loving families of those patients who are unable
to express themselves precisely should be able to make treatment deci-
sions on behalf of those patients. Yet, this rule may not allow them to do
so. In summary, because of the requirement of clear and convincing evi-
dence of the values and desires that the patient has actually expressed,
the rule may be overly restrictive.
The Missouri Supreme Court also rejected the use of the substituted
judgment standard in Cruzan v. Harmon.89 Cruzan is the only appellate
decision which refused to allow the guardian of a patient in a persistent
vegetative state to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. The Cruzan
court's analysis of the issues regarding the right to refuse treatment, the
right to privacy, and the authority of the guardian differs substantially
from that of the other courts which have addressed these issues.
Although the court recognized the common law right to refuse treat-
ment, it framed this right as a corollary of the doctrine of informed con-
sent. It failed to recognize that the doctrine of informed consent grew out
of the principle that unconsented medical treatment constituted a bat-
tery.90 It then reasoned that a patient could not possibly make an informed
decision under hypothetical circumstances because the requirement that
the patient clearly understand the risks and benefits of treatment or
refusal could-not be met.9 1
The Cruzan court also resisted the applicability of the constitutional
right of privacy to treatment decisions.9 2 It refused to apply the Quinlan
reasoning that a right of privacy broad enough to encompass the decision
to choose abortion would also protect the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment for oneself. Rather, the court emphasized the Supreme Court's
focus on procreation and family relationships within marriage in its anal-
ysis of the constitutional right of privacy and its concomitant refusal to
extend the privacy right to protect homosexual conduct.9 3 Even assuming
that the constitutional right of privacy applies to treatment decisions,
the court held that the right was too personal to be exercised by a guardian
or other third party without rigid formalities.9 4
Id. at 549-51, 531 N.E.2d at 624-26, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 904-05 (Simons, J.,
dissenting).
89 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
90 760 S.W.2d at 417. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(analysis of the doctrine of informed consent and its doctrinal sources).
"1 760 S.W.2d at 417.92 Id. at 418.
-Id.
9Id. at 425.
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The Missouri Supreme Court's analysis of the state's interests in-
volved in decisions concerning life-sustaining treatment departs sub-
stantially from those of other courts. Missouri claims a two-pronged
interest in life: an interest in the prolongation of the life of the particular
patient and an interest in preserving the sanctity of life generally.95 The
court relied on the abortion statute at issue in the recent case of Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services96 which granted the right to life to all
human beings, born or unborn,97 and defined a viable fetus as one whose
life "may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or ar-
tificial life support systems."98 The court also noted that Missouri's version
of the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act contained provisions which
reflected a greater state interest in life than the Uniform Act.99
The Cruzan court refused to consider the patient's prognosis in the
determination of the extent of the state's interest in preserving the pa-
tient's life, reasoning that a focus on the prognosis for recovery to the
patient's former capacity has resulted in decisions based on the quality
of the patient's life.' °° Rather, it characterized the state's interest in life
as unqualified. 10' The state's interest in life did not vary with the prog-
nosis of the patient, but remained constant and undiminished regardless
of the patient's condition. 0 2 It also noted that the possibility for the pro-
longation of Nancy Cruzan's life was substantial since she might live
another thirty years if artificial feeding and hydration were continued. 0 3
The court's analysis of the responsibilities of the patient's guardian
also differed from those of other courts that have considered the question.
Rather than viewing the right and responsibility to consent to medical
treatment on behalf of a ward as including the right to make an informed
refuse choice to or to terminate treatment, the Cruzan court interpreted
the Missouri guardianship statute as requiring the guardian only to pro-
vide medical care. 0 4
The source of the guardian's authority to act for the ward was crucial
to the court's analysis. Because the guardian's authority was derived from
the court rather than from the ward, and arose from the parens patriae
power of the state, the guardian could not exercise. any personal right of
the ward which would cause the ward to die. 05 The Cruzan court relied
in part upon Planned Parenthood v. Danforth0 6 for the proposition that
5 Id. at 419.
9 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.010 (1986).
" 760 S.W.2d at 419, quoting Mo. REV. STAT. & 188.015(7).
0 760 S.W.2d at 419-20, comparing the UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY
ILL ACT § 1(4), 9B U.L.A. 611 (1987) (Act amended 1989 and referred to Style
Committee; expected out of Committee Spring 1990) with Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 459.010(3).
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 419, 424.
104 Id. at 424.
105 760 S.W.2d at 426.
'0 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1975).
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the state cannot authorize a third party to exercise the patient's right of
privacy in decisionmaking. 07 In the court's view, the application of the
substituted judgment doctrine in treatment termination cases abrogated
rather than furthered the state's parens patriae power to protect the
helpless and to preserve life, because it allowed the guardian to make a
private, unilateral decision to cause the death of the ward. 08 For these
reasons, the court rejected the application of the substituted judgment
standard in life-sustaining treatment cases. 0 9 The reasoning used would
clearly prohibit the use of the best interests test as well.
In balancing the interests involved, the court ruled that treatment
must be continued because the prognosis for recovery of functioning was
irrelevant, the state's interest in the preservation of Cruzan's life out-
weighed any rights that were invoked on her behalf, and the treatment
was not burdensome or invasive. 1" 0 It also found the evidence of Nancy's
wishes inherently unreliable, and therefore insufficient to justify the
guardian's exercise of substituted judgment."' In summary, the majority
left no opening for the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ment from any patient who was not competent to request it.
It appears that the Cruzan court's unwillingness to accept a right of
privacy in medical decisionmaking influenced the result. The court re-
fused to rely upon the reasoning of any of the abortion cases except to
the extent that they limited the exercise of the right of privacy. Its claim
of an unqualified interest in life regardless of medical prognosis is unique
in this area of the law. In fact, the court has been criticized for preparing
the way for anticipated pro-life litigation rather than applying the law
to the task at hand."2
The reasoning of the New York Court of Appeals in O'Connor"3 is
much better suited to address the issue of the propriety and limits that
should be placed upon third party decisionmaking. Yet, that court's re-
sistance to any decision to terminate treatment that cannot be justified
by reference to a long standing commitment on the part of the patient to
forego life support may result in continuing the treatment of persons in
a persistent vegetative state with no possibility of a return even to limited
consciousness.
When a patient has been correctly diagnosed as permanently uncon-
scious, so that she will never again experience contact with the environ-
ment or the care that she is receiving, the best rule should permit the
withholding of life support. Nevertheless, when patients have even the
most limited contact with their environment, it is necessary that the law
require a decisionmaking process and a substantive standard which pro-
tect the patient from abuse. Yet, to require the continued provision of life
107 760 S.W.2d at 425.
10 1 Id. at 426.
109 Id.
110 Id.I1d.
112 760 S.W.2d at 441 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886.
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support to such patients solely because they did not adequately express
a clear, settled purpose to forego it may create a danger that family
members and physicians will circumvent the law because it is too re-
strictive. Then, they may make decisions to forego treatment sub silentio
or for inappropriate reasons.
VI. PROHIBITED FACTORS
In deciding upon the standard which should govern the decision of a
surrogate to forego life-sustaining treatment on behalf of a patient, courts
have generally eliminated certain factors from consideration by the sur-
rogate. Among these are the quality of life of the patient and the financial
interest of the surrogate or other family members in the decision.
Courts which have allowed the consideration of the quality of life to
any extent have distinguished the value of the patient's life to others
from the value that life in the terminal condition has for the patient.1 4
If the surrogate exercising substituted judgment believes that the patient
would have considered the extent of his or her incompetence as militating
in favor of terminating treatment, the surrogate can consider this fac-
tor.11 However, the surrogate cannot consider the utilitarian value of the
patient's life to others in deciding to terminate treatment.1 1 6
Some writers, however, would allow the surrogate to consider the
social value of the patient's life. They consider that the patient's life has
social value only to the extent that the patient is capable of interacting
with others. The patient who is no longer capable of communicating
thoughts and feelings has lost his or her humanity. Since the patient is
no longer a human being, a decision to end treatment does not terminate
a human life. 1 7
114 Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 222, 741 P.2d at 689; In re Gardner, 534 A.2d at
955; Brophy, 398 Mass. at 434, 497 N.E.2d at 635; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 754,
370 N.E.2d at 432; In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 367, 486 A.2d at 1232-33; see also
Deciding to Forego, supra note 1, at 135.
115 Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 222, 741 P.2d at 689; Brophy, 98 Mass. at 434, 497
N.E.2d at 635; In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 367, 486 A.2d at 1232-33; Deciding to
Forego, supra note 1, at 135.
116 Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 222, 741 P.2d at 689, n. 23; Brophy, 398 Mass. at
434, 497 N.E.2d at 635; In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 367, 486 A.2d at 1232-33. But
see Brophy, 398 Mass. at 427,497 N.E.2d at 631 (apparent approval of trial court's
consideration of the effects of continuation of treatment on the patient's family
as one of the factors that the patient would have considered).
In discussing the best interests test, the President's Commission also distin-
guishes between consideration of the social value of the patient's life and the
value of the patient's life to the patient. Only the latter should be considered
under the Commission's view. Deciding to Forego, supra note 1, at 135 n.43.
17 ETHmcs OF WITHDRAWAL, supra note 31, at 52-53. See also Buchanan & Brock,
Surrogate Decision Making for Elderly Individuals Who Are Incompetent or of
Questionable Competence in Surrogate Decisionmaking, supra note 37, at 86-87
(The Best Interest Principle imposes "a duty to do what best promotes someone's
interests or is most conducive to his or her good. As such, the Best Interest
Principle does not apply to beings who have no capacity for consciousness and
whose good can never matter to them, and this includes human beings who are
in a permanent vegetative state."); N. CANTOR, supra note 66, at 80.
[Vol. 3:2
JUST DECISIONMAKING
This position denigrates the value of the patient's life by focusing on
intellectual functioning and verbal communication. That the patient can
no longer communicate thoughts and feelings does not mean that the
patient has no such feelings. To withdraw care from a patient who was
aware but unable to communicate his or her objections would be horri-
fying.
The better view is that expressed by an author who considers per-
sonhood as encompassing three related capacities: the ability to reason,
to experience emotions, and to enter into relationships. 118 Although a
patient who has none of these capacities would no longer be a person
under this view, he would require the surrogate to treat as a person any
patient who still had the capacity to experience emotion, even if it were
only to the limited, self-absorbed extent of feeling pain.119 This view more
appropriately values the humanity of the patient as a whole, without
unduly emphasizing intellectual functioning.
One of the four state interests traditionally required to be balanced
against the right of the competent patient to choose to terminate treat-
ment is the interests of third parties.120 Originally, this state interest
encompassed the interests of a patient's minor children or dependent
spouse in maintaining life so that the patient could continue to meet their
needs.12 ' Yet, the emotional and financial needs of the family may work
in favor of a decision to terminate treatment.
No appellate case has directly addressed the extent to which the
surrogate should consider the cost of treatment. The cases have generally
noted that finances were not an issue in approving the decisions to ter-
minate treatment. 122 Under the logic of substituted judgment, the sur-
rogate ought to be able to consider the interests of third parties if it can
be established that the patient would have done so. However, the potential
for abuse would appear to require some extra procedural protection for
the patient.
The President's Commission recommended permitting the surrogate
to consider the impact of a treatment decision on the patient's family
even when applying the best interests standard. 23 The Commission rea-
soned that the best interests of a patient include the patient's interests
in the welfare of family and close associates. 124 Nevertheless, the Com-
mission would require a more stringent standard of proof to support the
surrogate's claim that the reasonable person in the patient's position
,18 D. CALLAHAN, SETING LIMITS 179-80 (1987).
1,9 See id. at 180.
120 See text accompanying notes 17 and 18 supra, and cases cited therein.
121 In re Farrell, 108 N.J. at 352, 529 A.2d at 412-13 (court noted that the
interests of the patient's children did not preclude withdrawal of the respirator
because there was no showing that the surviving parent would be unable to meet
the children's needs alone).
122 In re Spring, 380 Mass. at 640, 405 N.E.2d at 122. But see Leach, 68 Ohio
Misc. at 3, 426 N.E.2d at 810 (court noted both the anxiety of family members
and the cost of treatment in approving decision to terminate life support).
123 Deciding to Forego, supra note 1, at 135-36.
124 Id. at 135.
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would subordinate the patient's interest in continuing treatment to the
family's interest in avoiding the resulting financial or emotional bur-
den.125
Some scholars have suggested that age be a criterion in determining
the treatment which should be provided to a patient. Specifically, they
argue that society should not provide life-sustaining treatment for elderly
patients who have lived out a natural life span. 126 The rationale for this
position is based upon the limited availability of health care resources,
particularly the more expensive, high technology-based forms of treat-
ment. It is asserted that justice between age groups requires that the
elderly refrain from making unfair claims to the limited health care
resources available, so that society can guarantee to all the opportunity
to live out a natural life span. 27
The few cases that have considered the age of the patient appear to
have rejected it as a factor relevant to the treatment decision. In Delio
v. Westchester County Medical Center, 2 the Appellate Division rejected
the trial court's consideration of the youth of the 33-year-old patient as
relevant to its refusal to allow the termination of life support. The court
noted that age was relevant only in determining whether the patient had
made an informed decision. 129
The Conroy holding was limited to elderly nursing home residents
who had less than a year to live. °3 0 However, the court's reasoning was
based upon the distinctive vulnerability of elderly nursing home resi-
dents, not upon any difference in the claim of the elderly to medical
treatment.'
31
When the New Jersey Supreme Court refined Conroy, it announced
no difference in treatment or in the standard to be applied based upon
the age of the patient. Rather, the court retained the distinction between
elderly nursing home patients and other patients by granting the former
special procedural protections. 3 2 This special concern for the elderly be-
cause of their vulnerability tends to contradict an argument that the
elderly have a less weighty claim to the use of life-sustaining treatment
than other patients.
125 Id. at 136.
126 D. CALLAHAN, supra note 118; Battin, Age Rationing and the Just Distri-
bution of Health Care: Is There a Duty to Die?, 97 ETHics 317 (1987) [hereinafter
Duty to Die].
127 D. CALLAHAN, supra note 118, at 164-180; Duty to Die, supra note 126, at
324-28.
129 A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677.
Id. at 21, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 690-91.
3 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 363, 365, 486 A.2d at 1231, 1232.
13- Id. at 374-77, 486 A.2d at 1237-38.
132 In re Jobes, 108 N.J. at 410, 529 A.2d at 448; In re Peter, 108 N.J. at 384-
85, 529 A.2d at 429. Where the evidence of the patient's intention is insufficient
to meet the requirements of Conroy's subjective test, the family of the patient
must exercise substituted judgment using their knowlege of the patient's personal
values. In re Jobes, 108 N.J. at 415, 529 A.2d at 444.
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VII. THE MISCONCEPTION REGARDING THE EXERCISE OF
A PATIENT'S RIGHTS
Much conceptual confusion has resulted from the characterization of
the decision of a guardian or other surrogate as the exercise of the in-
competent's right.133 This was evident in Rasmussen v. Fleming.34 The
patient, a nursing home resident in her seventies, suffered from neuro-
logical disorders which were not clearly established in the opinion. The
patient's condition was described as "essentially vegetative," but the tes-
timony showed that she made nonverbal responses to questions and other
stimuli. 135 She was being fed through a nasogastric tube when the Public
Fiduciary sought appointment as her guardian for the purpose of con-
senting to the removal of the tube.
The guardian in this case was not a family member, but a public
official. No one knew Ms. Rasmussen's desires. The decisions to withhold
all but comfort care and to remove the source of her food and water were
not made by close, concerned family members, but by strangers.
The Arizona Supreme Court held that the guardian could exercise
the patient's right to terminate treatment if the guardian ad litem and
family agreed. 136 Because there was no evidence that Ms. Rasmussen had
ever expressed her wishes as to life support prior to becoming incompe-
tent, the guardian was to apply the best interests standard. 37
This decision did not prevent the possibility of allowing a semicons-
cious patient to die a painful death. The medical testimony appears to
have been much less extensive than that in Brophy 38 or Conroy. 39 None
of the witnesses mentioned in the opinion was a current attending phy-
sician. There was testimony by the investigator that the nurses attending
the patient thought that she retained some cognitive functioning. 40 The
court does not appear to have considered the suffering that death by
starvation and dehydration would have caused Ms. Rasmussen. Under
such circumstances, to call these actions the exercise of the patient's
"rights" is to ignore reality.
Further, the court did not address the possibility of medical error.
Rasmussen's physician had removed the nasogastric tube after the guard-
ianship petition was filed, but before any hearing had been held. In fact,
the patient had the ability to swallow, although she could not feed her-
self.'4 ' If there was medical error regarding the need for life support,
" See supra text accompanying notes 33 through 44.
134 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987).
Id. at 212, 741 P.2d at 679.
Id. at 224, 741 P.2d at 691.
Id. at 222, 741 P.2d at 689.
138 Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. at 444, 497 N.E.2d at
641 (1986).139 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
140 Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 212, 741 P.2d at 679.
141 Id. at 212, 741 P.2d at 679, n.1.
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perhaps there was also error with respect to the extent of Rasmussen's
ability to perceive and interact with her environment.
The California Court of Appeals recently formulated a more accurate
conception of the rights of incompetent patients in In Re Drabick,142 a
case involving a permanently comatose patient. The court reasoned that
the right of a competent patient to choose or refuse treatment survived
incompetence, so that the conservator may make treatment choices on
behalf of the conservatee. 43 However, the court termed the characteri-
zation of the surrogate's decision as the exercise of the patient's right to
choose as a legal fiction. 4 4 The incompetent's right is to have the con-
servator make appropriate decisions on his or her behalf.145 An appro-
priate decision is one made in the best interests of the patient.'46 The
conservator's choice in the patient's best interests may include consid-
eration of the patient's known preferences for medical treatment. 1 47 How-
ever, the primary determination that must be made by the conservator
of a comatose patient is whether, in good faith, he or she finds treatment
medically necessary, given the patient's prognosis for a return to a cog-
nitive, sapient existence.148
VIII. A PROPOSED STANDARD
By merging the two questions of whether and how treatment decisions
can best be made for incompetent patients into one question - how to
guarantee the right of the patient to terminate treatment, the courts have
confused the issue. Both the substituted judgment and the best interests
tests are insufficiently protective of patients because they permit manip-
ulation by unaware or uncaring surrogates. Further, both tests rely too
heavily upon a medical determination of the prognosis. Some patients
who doctors predicted would never regain consciousness have done so,
even as family members were arguing for a termination of life support. 149
The families contended that the patient would have made the choice to
terminate treatment.' 50 Yet, these patients, when actually confronted
with the choice of ending their lives or surviving in a severely disabled
condition, did not choose to terminate treatment. 5 1 The danger exists
that patients may die because treatment was terminated too early, with-
out sufficient consideration of all that could be done to help them.
142 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1988).
143 Id. at 207-09, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 854-55.
14 Id. at 208, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
.45 Id. at 205, 209, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 852, 855.
"I Id. at 205, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
147 In re Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 210, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
148 Id. at 210-11, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
149 Seligman, Whose Death Is It Anyway?, Newsweek, Apr. 24, 1989, at 69. See
also instances discussed in Currie, The Redefinition of Death in S.F. SPICKER,
ORGANISM, MEDICINE AND METAPHYSICS 177, 184-90 (1978).
15 Seligman, supra note 149, at 69.
,
51 Back from the Dead, Time, Oct. 6, 1986, at 35; cf. Seligman, supra note 149,
at 69.
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The proper question is how best to provide care for patients who are
no longer able to choose care for themselves. An appropriate decision
must approximate, to the extent possible, the decision that the patient
would have made if able to do so. Yet, even a surrogate who has intimate
knowledge of the patient's values, behavior, beliefs, and personality can,
at best, only attempt to predict the patient's choice.
Where the patient was formerly competent, the surrogate must de-
termine and consider his or her moral, spiritual, and emotional values,
goals in life, and the importance to the patient of various facets of life,
such as intellectual functioning, physical independence, and spiritual and
psychological connection. In addition, the surrogate should also know the
patient's attitudes concerning health care, adversity, and risk-taking.
In many cases, perhaps, a spouse, adult child, or parent will have
this knowledge. If the person who knows the patient best is not a relative,
it would be best for the patient to have appointed this person as a proxy
to make treatment decisions. However, when no one knows the patient
so intimately, or when the patient has never had the capacity to make
treatment decisions, the use of the substituted judgment standard is in-
appropriate.
Even the most well-intentioned surrogate with an intimate knowl-
edge of the patient may project his or her own values onto the patient or
confuse his or her own distress at the patient's condition with the needs
of the patient. In order to avert the possibility that a patient may die
because the surrogate considered inappropriate factors or failed to con-
sider how to improve the patient's life, I propose that a new factor be
added to both the substituted judgment and the best interests tests. The
surrogate must be required to improve the patient's life as the patient
experiences it.
As with any treatment decision, the surrogate must first determine,
to the extent medically possible, the patient's present levels of physical,
sensory, cognitive, and emotional functioning; the extent, severity, and
duration of physical pain; the prognosis for improvement or restoration
of function in any area and for further deterioration. The surrogate must
also consider exactly how a proposed treatment or nontreatment alter-
native would affect the patient. This would necessitate inquiry into the
perceptions that a patient with limited cognitive ability may have of her
environment and of the care that is provided for her.
When it is possible that the patient has greater capacity to perceive
reality than to communicate her perceptions to others, the surrogate
should assume that the patient perceives all of the care that is provided
for her and will perceive a withdrawal of life support as a withdrawal of
care. The surrogate should be required not only to examine the alter-
natives of providing or omitting life-sustaining treatment, but also to
take any other measures which might improve life as experienced by the
patient.
Addition of this element to the substituted judgment test would re-
quire the surrogate to consider that the patient's experience of life may
have value to him or her even though the patient may now be severely
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mentally disabled and in a condition that he or she might previously have
considered pitiable. By requiring that the surrogate take whatever meas-
ures would improve the patient's perceptions of life, the revised test places
the surrogate emotionally and perceptually in the position of the patient
insofar as that is humanly possible. This should maximize the empathy
and compassion of the surrogate for the patient.
This would modify the traditional best interests test since it does not
focus on the choice that most reasonable people would make for them-
selves in similar circumstances. Further, it requires the surrogate spe-
cifically to consider the ways in which the patient's life could be improved
and to take positive steps to do so regardless of the decision reached with
respect to life-sustaining treatment. It is designed to assure, to the extent
possible, the maximal exercise of empathy and compassion on the part
of the surrogate.
The encouragement of empathy is particularly important in those
situations where the guardian or other surrogate is someone who does
not know the patient intimately. Such a guardian may be motivated by
pity for another ill human being. Nevertheless, he or she will not be
guided by the love that family members or patient-appointed proxies will
usually have for the patient.
This modified standard also differs from the limited objective and
pure objective tests announced in Conroy in that it does not emphasize the
extent of physical pain or the benefits and burdens of treatment. In ad-
dition, the surrogate's decision is not limited to the issue of life-sustaining
treatment. In deciding whether to provide or forego life-sustaining treat-
ment, the surrogate must specifically consider how each treatment or
nontreatment alternative will be perceived by the patient and choose that
combination of alternatives which would most improve the patient's life.
At a minimum, the surrogate can make no decision that would cause new
suffering. To the extent that the pain and pleasure experienced by the
patient are affected by factors within the control of the surrogate, the
surrogate should be required to increase pleasure, or at least be forbidden
to cause new pain.
The application of this standard to the permanently unconscious pa-
tient would lead to the result on which most authorities already agree.
Because the permanently unconscious patient has no perceptions of self
or environment, nothing could be done to improve the patient's life as
she experiences it. By definition, the patient is incapable of experiencing
the care that she is receiving. For the same reason, the patient would
not experience the termination of life support as a withdrawal of care.
Therefore, life-sustaining treatment could properly be withdrawn.
In the more troubling case of a partially conscious patient, the sur-
rogate would not simply decide whether to continue or stop nasogastric
feeding. Suppose that, in Claire Conroy's situation, after an examination
of all the medical information of this particular patient and of the cog-
nitive abilities and perceptions of other patients with similar disabilities,
it were determined that she would not suffer from significant pain with
appropriate analgesics; that her moans indicated that she felt minor dis-
comfort; and that her smiles indicated pleasure. Suppose that she would
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experience more pleasure with simple human contact or other forms of
loving care, such as more frequent massages. If the surrogate were re-
quired to make the decision that would improve the patient's life as she
perceives it, the withdrawal of nasogastric feeding would be impermis-
sible. The standard would require the surrogate to provide the human
contact and loving care that would better the patient's life.
A surrogate may be swayed by the argument that discontinuing tube
feeding and hydration is the equivalent of turning off the machine that
breathes for the patient, ignoring the difference in time and suffering
between death by suffocation and death by starvation. If the facts of Ms.
Conroy's condition were as hypothesized, termination of treatment would
have caused tremendous new suffering. Bringing the surrogate into
greater touch with the emotional content of the decision would reduce
the temptation to rely upon the asserted lack of any objective distinction
between feeding or hydration and other life-sustaining procedures.
The emotional content of a decision is important to the surrogate as
well as to the patient. One aspect of the "slippery slope" or "wedge"
argument against terminating life support is that both the individuals
involved and society as a whole will become accustomed to causing the
deaths of others so that other killings no longer seem so wrong. 152 Deci-
sionmakers who have remained sensitive to the content of their decision
may well feel differently about starving Mama to death than they do
about turning off the machine that breathes for her.' 53
Regardless of the decision a surrogate makes, sooner or later, the
patient will die. Nevertheless, surrogates must live with themselves, and
the rest of us must live with them, after their decision points have passed.
It is important that the standards required of surrogate decisionmakers
foster compassion and empathy in order to avoid the gradual erosion of
society's respect for the rights and value of the lives of the severely
disabled.
Some believe that the reverence for life is the quality that distin-
guishes humanity from other forms of life.15 4 Others believe that our
,52 Gelfand, Euthanasia and the Terminally Ill Patient, 63 NEB. L. REV. 741(1984); Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy Killing"
Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969 (1958); Deciding to Forego, supra note 1, at 28-
29; D. BEAUCHAMP & T. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 122 (2d
ed. 1983); see also D. CALLAHAN, supra note 118, at 188-89 which discusses the
possibility that training health professionals to terminate artificial feeding of
dying elderly patients might pave the way for a routine cessation of nutrition
and hydration for the physically frail and demented elderly where death is not
yet imminent.
,53 The parents of Karen Ann Quinlan never sought to terminate her artificial
feeding even after the Conroy holding. They distinguished between the discon-
tinuation of the respirator and depriving their daughter of food. See N.Y. Times,
June 12, 1985, at Al, col.2, D27, col.3; N.Y. Times, June 16, 1985, at E22, col.3.
Many health professionals also are adverse to the discontinuation of artificial
feeding even though they support the withdrawal of other forms of life support
from dying patients. D. CALLAHAN, supra note 118, at 187-88.
164 See, e.g., In re Conroy, 188 N.J. Super. 523, 527, 457 A.2d 1232, 1235 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1983), rev'd, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303, cert. granted,
95 N.J. 195, 470 A.2d 418 (1983), rev'd, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
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distinguishing feature is the capacity for consciousness of any sort. 155
Perhaps, though, the behavior that differentiates humanity from other
forms of life is that we imbue our actions with emotional significance,
and we are conscious of the emotions that we create in ourselves and
prompt in others. To the extent that our actions have consequences in
the hearts and minds of the actors as well as in the outer world, we must
not ignore the significance of emotional content.
IX. CONCLUSION
The developing thought with respect to the treatment of incompetent
patients seems to be focused inordinately upon the facilitation of the
exercise of their right to avoid life-sustaining treatment. Further, the
emphasis of courts and writers on the value of intellectual functioning
devalues other aspects of life that severely disabled patients may yet be
experiencing.
When the patient is permanently unconscious, she cannot perceive
the cessation of care. Perhaps, then, no harm is done in allowing the
guardian and family to terminate treatment of patients in a persistent
vegetative state once the diagnosis and prognosis have been adequately
confirmed. Nevertheless, it is possible that a patient with limited ability
to communicate verbally may be learning from the experience in ways
that she cannot convey to her family or caretakers.
To allow a surrogate to make a decision which results in the death
of a sentient, conscious patient without the participation of the patient
in making that decision is to risk the possibility of murder of the patient
in the self-interest of the surrogate. Therefore, it is necessary to protect
incompetent patients both with appropriate procedural constraints 156 and
with an empathetic substantive standard governing the surrogate's ac-
tions.
The substantive standard must require the surrogate to expressly
consider all of the treatment options available from the patient's per-
spective and to make the decision that will improve the life experienced
by the patient to the extent that improvement is possible. The question
155 Buchanan & Brock, Surrogate Decision Making for Elderly Individuals who
are Incompetent or of Questionable Competence in Surrogate Decisionmaking,
supra note 37, at 85-86 ("If these individuals [in a persistent vegetative state]
can be said to have interests at all, this is only because the word 'interest' is used
in a very attenuated sense. A similar attenuated sense of the word may apply
when speaking of what is good or bad for rudimentary forms of animal life or
plants .... Whether .. . 'interests' are promoted or not, indeed whether it [a
rudimentary form of animal life] lives or dies, does not matter ... because it lacks
(and always will lack) consciousness of any sort."); cf. N. CANTOR, supra note 117,
at 80.
156 The issue of the appropriate procedure should be considered separately from
that of the substantive standard. The procedure to be followed is beyond the scope
of this Article.
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that the surrogate must ask is not, "May I discontinue treatment for this
patient?" but "How can I best provide care for this patient to improve her
life as she perceives it?" Unless the surrogate knows that the patient is
totally incapable of perception, and not merely impaired in the ability to
communicate, the surrogate should presume that the patient perceives
all of the care that is being provided and will perceive the discontinuation
of nutrition, hydration, or air as a withdrawal of care. This standard will
maximize the empathy and compassion exercised by the surrogate in
reaching a decision concerning life-sustaining treatment.

